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In Personam Jurisdiction-General Appearance
Howard W. L'Enfant*

In Socorro v. City of New Orleans,' the plaintiff sued several
defendants, including the City of New Orleans and its liability insurer,
to recover damages for the injuries plaintiff sustained in a diving accident
in Lake Pontchartrain which resulted in permanent quadraplegia. In the

petition the plaintiff named DEF Insurance Company as the liability
insurer of the City of New Orleans, and even though the plaintiff later
learned through discovery that Angelina Casualty Company was the
City's insurer, he did not amend the petition to substitute Angelina for
DEF Insurance Company or serve Angelina with process. Before trial,
an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment was filed on behalf of
the City and Angelina, which were represented by the same attorney.
After trial the court rendered a judgment against the City but refused

to enter judgment against Angelina. On appeal, the court of appeal
affirmed, 2 reasoning that the motion for summary judgihent filed by
Angelina did not constitute a general appearance subjecting it to the
jurisdiction of the court because under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 7,1 one must first be a party before one can make a general

Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Henry Plauche Dart Professor of Law, LSU.
1. 579 So. 2d 931 (La. 1991).
2. Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 561 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
3. La. Code Civ. P. art. 7 provides:
A. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a party makes a general
appearance which subjects him to the jurisdiction of the court and impliedly
waives all objections thereto when, either personally or through counsel, he
seeks therein any relief other than:
(1) Entry or removal of the name of an attorney as counsel of record;
(2) Extension of time within which to plead,
(3) Security for costs;
(4) Dissolution of an attachment issued on the ground of the nonresidence
of the defendant; or
(5) Dismissal of the action on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
over the defendant.
B. This Article does not apply to an incompetent defendant who attempts to
appear personally, or to an absent or incompetent defendant who appears through
the attorney at law appointed by the court to represent him.
C. When a defendant files a declinatory exception which includes a prayer for
the dismissal of the action on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
over him, the pleading of other objections therein, the filing of the dilatory
and peremptory exceptions therewith, or the filing of an answer therewith when
required by law, does not constitute a general appearance.
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appearance, and Angelina was not a party because it had not been
named in the petition.' The supreme court reversed, rejecting the appellate court's reading of Article 7 as too strict. The supreme court
argued that named parties who had not, been served could subject
themselves to jurisdiction by making a general appearance, and the court
pointed Out that unnamed parties, such as intervenors, could also subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court without having been named
or served with process.s Furthermore, once Angelina filed the motion
it was clear that it was the DEF Insurance Company named in the
petition, and, even more importantly, Angelina was not prejudiced or
adversely affected in any way because it was represented by the same
attorney who represented the City and had taken the same position on
liability as had been taken by the City.
This case is a good example of the application of the principle
expressed in Article 5051 that the articles of the Code are to be construed
liberally and that rules of procedure are not an end in themselves. The
issues of liability and damages were thoroughly litigated between the
plaintiff, the City and the City's insurer. The identity of the insurer
was known and it fully participated in the litigation through an attorney
retained to represent its interests. To hold that Angelina cannot be
named in the judgment because it was not named in the petition would
elevate the technicalities of pleading over the substance of the trial.
Furthermore, it would result in a needless prolongation of the proceedings
while the pleadings were amended to name Angelina as defendant because
the result would be the same after amendment since Angelina's insured
had been found liable.
In deReyes v. Marine Management and Consulting, Ltd.,6 the Louisiana Supreme Court considered whether it would violate the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment for Louisiana to assert in personam
jurisdiction over a Hong Kong corporation which maintained a regional
office in New Orleans in an action for the wrongful death of a Honduran
seaman who had died on board a Panamanian ship in international
waters off the coast of Oregon. The original due process test for in
personam jurisdiction, stated by the Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,' is that the nonresident defendant must have
certain minimum contacts such that the assertion of jurisdiction does
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 8 This
test has evolved into two separate but related components: "minimum

4. The court of appeal cited Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) for the definition
of "party."
5. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 1091, 1093.
6. 586 So. 2d 103 (La. 1991).
7. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
8. Id. at 320, 66 S.Ct. at 160.
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contacts" and "fairness." 9 The first component-minimum contactsexamines the defendant's relationship with the forum, and the secondfairness-balances the interest of the forum, the interest of the plaintiff,
the burden on the defendant, and the interest of the interstate judicial
system in the efficient resolution of controversies and in the furtherance
of substantive policies.' 0 In deReyes the first issue the Louisiana Supreme
Court had to resolve was whether this two-pronged test applied in cases
where the cause of action was unrelated to the defendant's activity in
the forum (general jurisdiction) or whether the sole inquiry was whether
the defendant had systematic and continuous contacts with the forum.
The court could not find a clear answer in the two United States Supreme
Court cases that dealt with the assertion of jurisdiction over a cause of
action unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum. The first
of those cases, Perkins v. Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co.," held that
the defendant's business activity in Ohio was sufficiently substantial and
of such a nature to support jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated
to that activity, but that case was decided before the development of
the separate "fairness" component of the test. In the second case,
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, " jurisdiction was
denied because the defendant did not have a systematic and continuous
relationship with the forum. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in InternationalShoe recognized that there had been cases in which continuous
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to support jurisdiction over those corporations on
causes of action unrelated to those activities."' These cases could be
read to support the position that when the cause of action is unrelated
to forum activity, the only jurisdictional inquiry is whether the defendant
had engaged in continuous and systematic activity in the forum. The
Louisiana Supreme Court in deReyes held that the same "minimum
contacts-fairness" test which applied in cases of specific jurisdiction
(causes of action arising out of forum-related activity) should also govern
in cases of general jurisdiction (causes of action unrelated to forum
activity); and, it is submitted that the court reached the correct result
on this issue.
When the Supreme Court decided InternationalShoe it stated that
the real question in in personam jurisdiction cases was not whether the
9. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct.
1026 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
10. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026; Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct.
2174; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559.
11. 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413 (1950).
12. 466 U.S. 408, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984).
13. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318, 66 S. Ct. 154, 159
(1945).
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nonresident corporation was "doing business" or was "present," because
that was merely to beg the question, as such phrases merely expressed
activities that were sufficient to satisfy due process,' 4 but did not make
it clear why those activities were sufficient. Instead, the court declared
that the inquiry should be to measure the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." While
it is clear that a state may not assert jurisdiction over a defendant with
which it has no contacts, the litigation-provoking question is how much
contact is enough. Later cases have made this clearer by emphasizing
that the due process clause protects a defendant's liberty interest-that
the defendant's connection with the forum must be deliberate and purposeful and must give him fair warning that he could expect to be haled
into the forum as a result of his activity. 6 This factor applies in all
assertions of jurisdiction-specific and general-because the liberty interest of the defendant is the same in each case. But even if there is
sufficient contact to satisfy this part of the "minimum contact" test,
there is still an examination of the fairness factors. Sometimes these
factors will convince a court that the assertion of jurisdiction would be
unfair even if the defendant has the requisite minimum contact. For
example, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,7
the United States Supreme Court held that the assertion of jurisdiction
by California over a Japanese corporation would violate due process
even though there were minimum contacts. In reaching its decision the
court found that California had no interest in the claim for indemnification between Japanese and Taiwanese corporations even though the
accident occurred in California, that the plaintiff had no interest because
his claim had been settled, and that the burden on the defendant was
heavy. This case strongly suggests that the same fairness factors are also
applicable in a case of general jurisdiction. If the cause of action is
not connected with the forum and the plaintiff is not a resident of the
forum, then the same lack of plaintiff and forum interest plus the same
heavy burden on the defendant could support a similar finding that the
assertion of jurisdiction is unfair even if the defendant has deliberate
beneficial contacts with the forum as in Asahi. Furthermore, if the court
has held that in cases of general jurisdiction the only test was whether
the defendant was doing continuous and systematic business, then the
court would have been doing the same thing that courts using "presence"

14.

15.
16.

Id. at 316, 66 S. Ct. at 158.
Id. at 319, 66 S. Ct. at 160.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); World-

Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
17.

480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
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and "doing business" had been doing, that is, asking the wrong question.
The question is not whether the defendant is doing continuous and
systematic business, but whether it would offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice to assert jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant.'"
In applying the two part "minimum contacts" and "fairness" test
the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a five to two decision, reversed the
court of appeal on the grounds that first, the court of appeal had
misapplied the fairness factors and had failed to consider all of the
pertinent evidence and inferences that favored the plaintiff, and, second,
the appellate court had erred in overlooking that the burden of proof
had shifted to the defendant and that the defendant had failed to
discharge that burden. It is the second point that should be explored
because it may indicate a significant change in the law.
According to the majority opinion, once the plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum, there
is a presumption that the assertion of jurisdiction is reasonable, and
the burden of production and persuasion shifts to the defendant to
overcome this presumption by showing that the assertion of jurisdiction
is unreasonable. Thus the court seems to be changing the generally
understood rule that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that
the court has jurisdiction over the defendant 19 and also seems to be
suggesting that this is required by the nature of the two part test for
jurisdiction. But in Burger King,20 the United States Supreme Court in
describing the application of the due process test stated, "Once it has
been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts
within the forum state, these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice."' 2 This does not
in any way suggest the establishment of a presumption in favor of
jurisdiction once minimum contacts have been established, nor does it
suggest a shifting of the burden of proof. Certainly it is reasonable to
shift to the defendant the burden of producing evidence on the issue
of how burdensome litigation in the forum would be for the defendant
because this evidence would be most readily available to that party, but
that is very different from establishing a presumption of jurisdiction
which the defendant must overcome by convincing evidence and from

18. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2584 (1977): "We
therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according

to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."
19. Colwell Realty Investments, Inc. v. Triple T Inns of Arizona, Inc., 785 F.2d
1330, 1332 (5th Cir. 1986).
20. 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
21. Id.at 476, 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
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ruling in favor of jurisdiction because the defendant failed to carry that
burden of proof as the court did in deReyes.
Venue
In Fox v. Board of Supervisors,2 a student at St. Olaf's College
in Minnesota sued his college, Louisiana State University (L.S.U.), and
its insurers in Louisiana state court to recover for injuries he had
sustained during a rugby match played at L.S.U. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of L.S.U. and its insurer and dismissed St.
Olaf and its insurers on an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court of appeal affirmed as to L.S.U. and St. Olaf, but as to St.
Olaf's insurers, the court ruled that they were subject to personal jurisdiction because they were doing business in Louisiana. However, the
court dismissed the action against them on forum non conveniens
grounds. 3 This decision created a split in the circuits on the existence
of forum non conveniens between the first circuit in Fox and the fifth
circuit in Kassapas v. Akron Shipping Agency, Inc."4 The Louisiana
Supreme Court granted plaintiff's application for writs.25
The supreme court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
L.S.U. and its insurer and affirmed the dismissal of St. Olaf on lack
of personal jurisdiction but reversed the dismissal of St. Olaf's insurers
on forum non conveniens grounds. In tracing the history of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens the court noted that the doctrine had been
consistently applied in Louisiana. 6 The change in application began
when Louisiana courts held that they had no authority to transfer a
case from one Louisiana court of proper venue to another Louisiana
court of proper venue." To cure this problem the legislature enacted
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 123.8 Although the legislation

22.
23.
24.

576 So. 2d 978 (La. 1991).
Fox, 559 So. 2d 850 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990).
485 So. 2d 565 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).

25. Fox, 565 So. 2d 930 (La. 1990).
26. Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195, 86 So. 734 (1920); Smith v. Globe Indemnity
Co., 243 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Union City Transfer v. Fields, 199 So.
206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
27. Chaney v. Williher, 205 So. 2d 770 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1967); Trahan v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., 200 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
28. La. Code Civ. P. art. 123.
A. For the convenience of the panics and the witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court upon contradictory motion, or upon the court's own
motion after contradictory hearing, may transfer a civil case to another district
court where it might have been brought; however, no suit brought in the parish
in which the plaintiff is domiciled, and in a court which is otherwise a court
of competent jurisdiction and proper venue, shall be transferred to any other
court pursuant to this Article.
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dealt only with intrastate change of venue, it was used by the court in
Kassapas9 to conclude that the authority of Louisiana courts to dismiss
cases must also be based on legislation and that courts did not have
inherent authority to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds.
In 1988, the legislature amended Article 123 to authorize dismissal of
certain federal causes of action. 0 The supreme court examined the
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in other jurisdictions
and found that only a small minority of states refused to apply it.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Louisiana courts do not have the
inherent authority to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds.
The only authority to do so is found in Article 123, and since that
article did not authorize dismissal under the facts in Fox, the judgment
dismissing the action against St. Olaf's insurers was reversed.
This decision raises some important questions. The first is whether
Article 123 is constitutional. Under this article the only cases that would
be dismissed are cases arising under federal law. Thus in cases presenting
identical facts except that one case is based on federal law and the
other on state law, a Louisiana court could dismiss the federal claim
but not the state claim. This raises the argument that Louisiana is
discriminating against the federal claim; this the United States Supreme
Court has held a state may not do. 3
A further question is whether the legislature should authorize courts
to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds. One argument
against such a doctrine is that a defendant is adequately protected by
the due process limitations on in personam jurisdiction. The problem
with this argument is that due process and forum non conveniens focus

485 So. 2d at 566.
La. Code Civ. P. art. 123:
B. Except as provided in Paragraph C, upon the contradictory motion of
any defendant in a civil case filed in a district court of this state in which a
claim or cause of action is predicated solely upon a federal statute and is based
upon acts or omissions originating outside of this state, when it is shown that
there exists a more appropriate forum outside of this state, taking into account
the location where the acts giving rise to the action occurred, the convenience
of the parties and witnesses, and the interest of justice, the court may dismiss
the suit without prejudice; however, no suit in which the plaintiff is domiciled
in this state, and which is brought in a court which is otherwise a court of
competent jurisdiction and proper venue, shall be dismissed pursuant to this
Article. In the interest of justice, and before the rendition of the judgment of
dismissal, the court shall require the defendant or defendants to file with the
court a waiver of any defense based upon prescription, provided that a suit on
the same cause of action is commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction
within sixty days from the rendition of the judgment of dismissal.
C. The provisions of Paragraph B shall not apply to claims brought pursuant
to 46 USC § 688 or federal maritime law.
31. McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690 (1934).

29.
30.
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on different considerations. Due process is concerned with the fairness
of requiring a defendant to litigate in a particular forum, whereas the
doctrine forum non conveniens assumes that there is more than one
forum with jurisdiction over the defendant (and therefore a "fair"
forum) and seeks to determine if another forum would be a more
convenient place of trial. Such a doctrine is especially needed in cases
of general jurisdiction where the cause of action arises elsewhere and
the defendant is subject to jurisdiction because it is licensed to do
business in the state, or, as in Burnham v. SuperiorCourt of California,32
the defendant is an individual who was served with process while in
the state. In these cases, factors such as the location of witnesses and
other evidence and familiarity with the law to be applied may make
the place where the cause of action arose a more convenient place for
trial. In such instances, Louisiana courts should have the authority to
apply the principles of forum non conveniens.

32. 495 U.S. 604, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990).

